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study the effects of population aging and population decline. In an invariant scenario public
and foreign debt explode and GDP growth decreases markedly. Among the tested policies
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which needs to increase 6 years, a similar magnitude as the increase in life expectancy at
birth. However, this increase has to happen before the increase in life expectancy materi-
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1 Introduction
People are living longer than ever and consequently, the World’s population is aging. Accord-
ing to the United Nations (2015), the world’s median age will increase from 29.6 in 2015 to
36.1 in 2050 and 41.1 in 2100. Analyzing the aging process of advanced economies is partic-
ularly relevant because they have usually a mature social security system that is sensitive to
demographic changes. It is also important to quantify behavioral effects, i.e. the consumer’s
reaction to a higher life expectancy, as that may mitigate the expected negative effects in the
economy from an aging population.
With the purpose of performing this analysis, we developed in Guerra et al. (2018a,b) an
overlapping general equilibrium endogenous growth model in order to study the transition
dynamics of a small open economy affected by demographic changes. The consumer block,
developed in Guerra et al. (2018b), shows consumers performing lifetime utility maximiza-
tion, facing an age-dependent mortality law and allocating time freely at the intensive margin
between leisure, learning, and work. The model includes a PAYG type pension system. The
production sector developed in Guerra et al. (2018a) consists of a horizontal innovation endo-
genous growth model. The model has two sources of growth: research and human capital, the
latter because of a human capital externality introduced.
In this article, we perform the numerical simulation of that model. We calibrate the model
with data from Portugal. Portugal is a good choice because it is a small open economy that is
projected to have a strong population aging process. The model is run for a period spanning
50 years. The demographic data we use for this period is characterized by an increase in life
expectancy at birth of approximately six years, a decrease in total population of 21.7% and
an increase in the total dependency ratio of nearly thirty percentage points.
We have several goals. Firstly, to quantify the magnitude of this demographic change in
the economy, mostly in terms of public and foreign debt, GDP growth but also at the con-
sumer level, like the accumulation of human capital and labor supply. Another goal is to assess
if in general equilibrium there exists a positive behavioral effect of the agents related to the
increase in life expectancy and if so, how strong it is. Also, since we expect problems with debt
sustainability, we want to test and compare several policies that can be used to keep public
finances controlled. Finally, since our demographic scenario is characterized by both aging and
a decreasing population, we would like to have an idea of the relative impact of each process.
We should expect a big impact on the economy of this demographic change. This expect-
ation is supported by evidence that shows a significant influence of demographic variables in
the economy, but also because as we show in Guerra et al. (2018a), GDP per capita is affected
negatively by a deterioration of the dependency ratio. This is in line with findings of, for
example, Sánchez-Romero (2013), that in a study with endogenous labor supply and pensions
applied to Taiwan, concludes that the demographic transition explains 22% of GDP per capita
growth for the period 1965-2005. On the other hand, a recent study by Acemoglu and Re-
strepo (2017) finds no evidence of a negative impact of aging on GDP per capita and suggests
that technology adoption adjusts in a way that compensates for the potential negative effect
of aging. Our model reveals an impact on GDP per capita, in particular in the period where
the total dependency ratio adjusts the most.
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The issue of whether there is a positive behavioral effect associated with aging has received
a lot of attention in the literature. Hazan (2009) investigates if there is a Ben-Porath mechan-
ism that connects life expectancy to an increase in human capital. He does this by noting that
a necessary condition for this mechanism to exist is that lifetime labor supply should increase.
Hazan computes a measure of this labor supply for the American population and notes that it
decreased in time, which violates that necessary condition because life expectancy was rising.
While Hazan used a fully rectangular survival law, Cervellati and Sunde (2013) generalize
that analysis for an age-dependent survival law because a fully rectangular survival law does
not capture changes in the survival law during working ages. Instead of Hazan’s necessary
condition, they posit that the necessary condition for the Ben-Porath mechanism to exist is
that increases in longevity raise the benefits of schooling relative to the opportunity cost of
delaying the entry in the labor market. Data shows substitution effects from labor supply to
schooling at younger ages, which is consistent with their necessary condition. They perform
a numerical analysis that shows that is possible for an increase in longevity to simultaneously
increase schooling and reduce lifetime labor supply.
Two recent panel data studies weigh in on a positive human capital effect on the economy
arising from aging. Cuaresma et al. (2014) find that the demographic dividend is mostly an
education dividend.1 Kotschy and Sunde (2018) project a strong negative consequence of aging
for macroeconomic performance which could be compensated by human capital accumulation
but estimate that human capital expansion might not be enough.
We also find a strong negative effect of aging on GDP growth and a positive behavioral
effect, but the latter is not enough to compensate the former. This behavioral effect operates
mainly through an increase in labor supply, with the increase in human capital being negligible.
The article is organized as follows. The next section presents the calibration exercise. Sec-
tion 3 explains the general numeric procedure. Section 4 presents the results of the numerical
simulation and Section 5 concludes.
2 Calibration
The model is run for a 50 year period, starting in 2020.2 We chose Portugal as the source of
data to calibrate the model, because Portugal is a small open economy facing adverse demo-
graphics. The calibration of the parameters was based on a mix of known values for Portugal
and of the desired properties of the system in order to replicate empirical regularities. Much of
this data is obtained from the AMECO database, which is the macroeconomic database main-
tained by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
As the model that we simulate is developed elsewhere (Guerra et al. (2018b) and Guerra
et al. (2018a)), in Appendix B we present the relevant functional forms in order to allow for a
1The demographic dividend is a concept that represents the positive effect on an economy of changes in the
age structure of the population when the labor force grows at a higher rate than the population.
2We do not perform a robustness analysis, running the model for different parameters as that is not our
main goal. After we chose our base parameters we ran the model with them.
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better understanding of the calibration exercise.
2.1 Consumers and Government
The parameters values from the consumer block are the ones used in the base scenario of
the numerical simulation performed in Guerra et al. (2018b). All parameters used in our
calibration are shown in Table 1. Regarding the government sector, we defined government
consumption, G, as a fixed proportion of GDP. We chose it to be 17%. This value is in line
with the historical average but is lower than recent values. The AMECO database shows an
average of approximately 20% in the new millennium. We opted for the lower value because
there are many government sources of revenue that we did not include in the model. Accord-
ing to the Portuguese General Government Account for 2016, the weight of indirect taxes on
GDP, excluding Value Added Tax (VAT), is 4.4%. By using a lower value for G/GDP we try
to partially compensate for this absence.
Another tax that we do not have is VAT. VAT receipts evolve at the same rate as consump-
tion so we included an updating rule in our lump sum tax (z0) in order for this tax to increase
at the same rate as the increase in consumption. In this way, the evolution of the lump sum
receipts will be a bit closer to the evolution of VAT receipts in a real economy although it
will still differ because of the impact of the population decrease. Since we had to fix this tax
rate before we compute the consumption for each age cohort, this rule updates z0 with a one
iteration lag: z0(t) = z0(t− 2) ∗ (C(t− 2)/C(t− 4)).3
For the corporate tax, we used a value of 22.5% which corresponds for the Portuguese
corporate tax of 21.5% plus an average 1% municipal tax.
For the initial ratio of government deficit and public debt over GDP we opted to align it
with the recommended goal of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, which sets a reference
value of 3% for the deficit and 60% for the debt. So, we fixed the initial debt at that value.
Regarding the deficit, after we defined the other fiscal parameters, we experimented with the
lump sum tax, and fixed it at 0.0485 which results in an initial deficit of 2.1%, which is within
the desired threshold.
As at the start of the simulation there will be already people retired, we needed to define
how much each retired cohort was receiving in pension benefits. After computing the pension
for the new retiree at the start of the model, we assumed every cohort was receiving a pension
that was 4% lower than the immediately younger cohort, so the pension of people aged 82 at
the start of the model was lower 4% than the pension of people aged 80. This assumes an
average growth of new pensions of 2% per year. We chose this number because it is similar
to the average growth rate of the wage rate displayed by the model and this is how much
pensions should rise with a time invariant labor offer and human capital.
Although we had a goal for the initial deficit, we could not have one for the composition
of government expenses in pensions and education. This happens because the way we model
educational expenses is different from a real economy as we link a subsidy to time dedicated to
3We compute the economy problem, not annually, but every two years.
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studying. This ends up putting a big weight on educational expenses as a percentage of GDP
and is compensated by a lower weight of pensions over GDP than we observe for Portugal.
2.2 Capital
To compute the depreciation rate, we use the capital and investment series of AMECO and
construct the depreciation rate for the period 1960-2019.4 This gives an average depreciation
rate of 5.6%. We use the value of α = 0.35 which is the value that was used in constructing
the series of AMECO, according to Havik et al. (2014).
In Guerra et al. (2018b) we explain why we set the low interest rate, r at 3%. The high
interest rate rk and the parameter γ that defines the degree of substitutability between durable
goods were determined simultaneously. For this, we resorted to the total capital/output ratio




rk/p+ (1− tp)(1− αγ)
rk/α+ (1− tp)(1− αγ)gA
Our idea was to define a capital-output ratio in the vicinity of 3 and to have the markup within
Norrbin (1993) estimates. Several combinations were possible. We settled for γ = 1.95, that
delivered an implicit rk of 7.1%. We decided to round it to 7% as this value also corresponds
to the average long-term return on equity reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985) for the USA
and is used commonly in quantitative studies, two examples being Jones and Williams (2000)
and Strulik (2007). The resulting markup is 1.465, on the upper limit of Norrbin’s findings.
2.3 Research Production Function
Calibration of the production function on research is slightly more complicated. We need to
specify ξ, ζ, ϕA, T2020 = A
∗
2020/A2020, A2020, and the exogenous growth rate of A
∗.
We assume that, in our model, an economy at the frontier will have a research function
with the same parameters as ours except for the catching up term, which vanishes. Through-
out the calibration, we are going to use the United States of America (US) economy as the
proxy for an economy at the technological frontier.
There is one aspect to take into consideration when calibrating the model with parameters
deduced from the data. Our model is on a different scale, as time allocation is not defined in
hours but as a percentage of total time. As such, aggregate human capital (H) is on a different
scale than what we would obtain from the data. In the production function of the final goods
sector, our scale parameter µ will make one of the necessary adjustments. Appendix E shows
that, besides µ, only ζ needs to be scaled down. All the other parameters can be in the same
magnitude as provided by the data.
AMECO’s data regarding TFP shows average annual growth rates of 1.9% and 1.1%, for
PT and US, respectively. We assume that the economy at the frontier will share the parameter
ϕA with other economies, the only feature distinguishing them is the catching-up term. Then,
4The AMECO series have already some extrapolated values until 2019 that we decided to let in the sample.
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we did a similar exercise as in Jones and Williams (2000) to determine ϕA, but we needed to
interpret the TFP data in light of our model. Resorting to Havik et al. (2014) we see that
TFP calculation is based on a production function that has as inputs capital and labor. The
contribution of human capital is thrown into the TFP. Hence, we needed to extract from the
TFP the contribution of human capital in order to have our TFP aligned with the one of
AMECO. Since AMECO uses a production function of a final goods sector type, we compare
it with our production function of that sector, implicitly assuming it represents GDP and
therefore ignoring the contribution of the research sector, assuming, as seems reasonable, that
it was small during the timeframe to which the data reports.
We will denote all growth rates by g. Using the expression for the production function of
the final goods sector (6), the growth rate of the output of this sector is given by:
gY = (1− α)gHY + (1/γ− α)gA + αgK
If AMECO’s production function used human capital too we could simply say that gTFP =
(1/γ − α)gA, which is what Jones and Williams (2000) did. However, it is not the case. We
used an approximation of considering that our measure of human capital is labor force times
hours worked times individual capital. Using the definition for H in (5), gH ≈ gLf + gsw + gh.
Because we are now aligning GDP by the production of the final goods sector, we assume
gHY = gH. Then,
gY ≈ (1− α)(gLf + gsw) +
[
(1− α)gh + (1/γ− α)gA
]
+ αgK
Now we can identify the expression inside squared brackets as similar to the TFP of the
AMECO series obtaining:
gA ≈ (gTFP − (1− α)gh) (1/γ− α)−1 (1)
For gh, the growth rate of individual human capital, we used the Barro and Lee (2013) series
on average years of total schooling (population aged 15-64) for the period 1960-2010. The
series is available with 5-year intervals and we used linear interpolation to fill in the gaps and
also to extrapolate the series till 2019.
When obtaining the growth rate of A, we noticed that g∗A (US) still appears to be roughly
constant after the human capital adjustment, so we proceeded like in Jones and Williams
(2000), assuming the time derivative of g∗A is zero, setting ϕA = 1− g
∗
HA
/g∗A. If we call cA the
proportion of human capital employed in research, then HA = caH and we can approximate
gHA by:
gHA = gcA + gH
≈ gcA + gLf + gsw + gh
Where we used the approximation to gH as before.
5 For gsw we used the series regarding hours
of work from the OECD (2018a) (1960-2016). We also used OECD data (OECD (2018b)) re-
garding employment in research. We use the rate of growth of employment in research as a
5There is a slight abuse here. To match our expression of the TFP with the data, we assumed GDP was
produced with the final goods sector production function, based on the assumption that the weight of the
research sector was small during the period the data relates to. Nevertheless, now we take into consideration
the change in the allocation of human capital to the research sector. We decided to do so, because our previous
assumption was meant as an approximation and because there was, in fact, significant changes to the human
capital employed in research since 1960.
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proxy to our rate of growth of human capital employed in research (gcA).
6 Data is available
from 1981 to 2015, We extrapolated linearly the years from 1960 to 1980 based in the nearest
growth rate and also the year 2016. Since the last data point for hours of work was 2016, we
decided in both these series to not extrapolate it further till 2019. Regarding labor force we
use data from AMECO again.
We obtain the following annual growth rates from the data for the US: g∗cA = 0.01652,
g∗Lf = 0.0143, g
∗
sw = −0.00156, g
∗
h = 0.00567, g
∗




0.03493 and, with γ = 1.95 and α = 0.35, using (1) we obtain g∗A = 0.04634. As a result of
this exercise we obtain ϕA ≈ 0.246, so we use ϕA = 0.25. This value is lower than the lower
bound in Jones and Williams, but we are factoring in human capital. The result goes in the
direction of the study by del Barrio-Castro et al. (2002) in which they find that the elasticity
of TFP to domestic R&D decreases markedly once human capital is taken into consideration.
We need to specify an exogenous growth rate of ideas for the economy at the frontier. We
do it by comparing its value with the one our economy will have. From the data, we obtain for
PT, gh = 0.023545 and gTFP = 0.01904, resulting in gA = 0.023. This means that historically,
for the time frame we use, g∗A/gA = 2.018. The growth rate of ideas at the frontier has grown
approximately twice on average than the case of PT. This means that there has not been any
convergence on the level of the stock of ideas, which seems at odds with our model, which
implies a convergence with the frontier. However, if we use 5-year intervals data displays some
convergence in the growth rate of ideas although not for the entire period. The difference
between g∗A and gA has been decreasing.
When we calibrate the model, we have an initial growth of A of 5.87% so we set the
exogenous growth g∗A = 11.74% which is twice the value of gA. This is much higher than
the historical rate but the model cannot replicate well levels of some variables, so instead of
worrying with the level of g∗A we set it at a comparable ratio to gA.
We set T2020 = 3.43 through a procedure, explained in Appendix D, that starts with a ratio
of GDP per capita by purchasing power between the US an Portugal, and works its way to a
ratio of TFP and then to a ratio of A.
The remaining parameters were obtained jointly with the initial proportion of human
capital dedicated to research. For this, we use the following three expressions for HY , gHY and
6We cannot use employment in research to calibrate the level of our allocation to research. What our model
allocates to research is human capital. Only because we take the simplifying assumption that average human
capital is the same in research as in the sector producing the final goods, this allocation of human capital
translates to an allocation of people. Nevertheless, to follow through with the calibration, we assume that the
growth rate of employment in research provided by the data can be a good proxy to the growth rate of human
capital employed in research.
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gH(1− α) + α(1− cA)gHY
1− αcA
≈ 0.015





ξAϕA−1 + ζ(T − 1)
]
And we used gHA = (gH − gHY (1− cA))/cA to obtain the last expression.
These three equations are used to determine the unknowns from the research sector. We
set the goal gHY = 0 as it is a neutral starting point and we want gȲ (the GDP growth rate)
to be near 1.5% because it is AMECO’s estimate of the growth rate of potential output for
Portugal for 2019.7
Nevertheless, we still have the problem of needing to estimate six unknowns (A2020, ξ, ζ,
cA, gH, H) with three equations. Hence, we further assume gH = 0, keeping the same neutral
stance we took for the goal for gHY , and we set ξ = 0.1 based on the literature, as we could
not find a satisfactory way to determine it.8
Now, we are still left with four unknowns for three equations. The determination of the
parameters will depend on the initial level of H, which comes from the consumer maximization
problem. This is a completely decentralized economy that required us to run the consumer
problem in order to obtain H, but the result of his maximization problem will affect everything
in the economy. We needed a value of H to determine the unknowns of the research function
but at the same time, we needed the general equilibrium of the model to display similar ratios
as a real economy and an acceptable initial government deficit. In fact, many of the values set
for the parameters at the consumer level were chosen to take into consideration the desired
properties at the aggregate while remaining within thresholds accepted by the microeconomic
literature. We ran the simulation many times, making incremental changes in parameters be-
cause every time we changed some parameter slightly all the consumer maximization changed.
After several tries, we obtained a level of H = 1 213 490 that provides an initial equilibrium
of the economy with the desired properties and satisfying gHY = 0 and with gȲ = 1.47%. The
estimated values are A2020 = 21 557 956, cA = 0.1 and ζ = 0.000000069.
7These growth rates we mention are instantaneous growth rates. When the simulation is run, the initial
growth rates will be slightly different, because we use a Runge-Kutta algorithm to integrate the set of equations
(Ȧ, Ḋ) at the aggregate level, and the right-hand side of the functions is influenced by the plans of the consumers.
8This value is used, for example, by Funke and Strulik (2000), Gómez (2005) and Sequeira and Reis (2006).
8
We cannot compare our cA with employment in research from data.
9 It is naturally higher.
Only because we make the assumption that average individual human capital is the same re-
gardless of the sector where it is being used, is that the allocation of human capital translates
into an allocation of people. There are two reasons why it predicts more people employed in
research than in reality. One is that on average, the human capital of a worker in research
should be much higher than in the production of goods, but since the model has no hetero-
geneity in human capital it will adjust by allocating more people to research. Also, the model
assumes that human capital has a generic nature, can be applied anywhere and people with
different human capital levels are substitutable. Since this is not true, this unaccounted het-
erogeneity in the type of human capital acquired will also make cA higher than in the case
where human capital heterogeneity was accounted for.10 It is hard to see how someone with
a PhD in Quantum Physics with, for example, 24 years of schooling, can be replaced by three
dropouts from secondary school with 8 years of schooling each.
Although ζ looks very low, this happens because it is affected by the different scale in
which our model is built. If we multiply our time allocation by the appropriate constant to
make it annual, we will get the proper value of ζ that can be compared with models based on
annual hours of work and study. In Appendix E we show that only ζ is affected by the scale
factor in the research sector but also how to arrive at the proper constant c that we have to





Where cs is the constant we multiply to the time allocation s
w and sh in the consumer problem
to make it annual.
Since we use ϕh = 0.5 and ϕη = 0.01. This gives c = c
1.505
s . The highest value we can
consider for cs is 8 760 (24 hours, 365 days per year). With this, we have the true value of
ζ without the scale effect of approximately 0.06. This is the upper bound for ζ. In truth,
it should be lower, because we cannot say people can freely choose between all three time
activities during the full day, as there are physical limitations to that decision. Also, institu-
tional aspects will make it lower, like the existence of a mandatory period of vacations or bank
holidays.
The adequate results from the consumer were achieved with a wage rate of w = 4.5, ob-
tained through experimentation. Since we need to have wy = wA and since wY depends on µ,
the latter was chosen as to equalize the two wage rates, resulting in µ = 0.179846776325242.
This scale parameter, together with ζ are the only ones that are affected by the different scale
of the model.
9The OECD (2018b) reports for Portugal, in 2016, that employment in research activities is 0.88% of total
employment.
10Nevertheless, our result is a bit higher than what is usually found in other studies. Strulik (2007) gets a
value of 6.34% for the decentralized equilibrium and 6.53% for the social planner, Funke and Strulik (2000)
obtain 7.5%, Sequeira and Reis (2006) approximately 8% and Grossmann et al. (2015) in one of their scenarios
obtain 10.4%.
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In the next table, we present the parameters used to run the model and in Table 2 some
ratios at the start of the simulation.
Table 1: Parameters and initial values of variables used in the numerical simulation
Consumer
σ ϵ φ r ρ w ξh ϕh ϕη η δh
2 4 0.8 0.03 0.02 4.5 0.0381 0.5 0.01 0.9926 0.01
Government
S R tp γe z0 zl zp θ G
18 66 0.225 0.288 0.0485 0.4698 0.1223 0.56425 0.17 GDP
Final Goods
rk α γ µ
0.07 0.35 1.95 0.179847
Research
cA T ϕA ξ ζ A2020 g
∗
A/gA
0.1 3.43 0.25 0.1 0.000000069 21 557 956 2
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Table 2: Initial ratios
% of GDP
Lump sum tax 6.07 Physical capital 176.82
Labor income tax 31.64 Incorporeal capital 114.75
Corporate tax 0.82 Capital (total) 291.56
Pensions (brut) 9.32 Investment (total) 19.06
Educational grant 13.65 Consumption 62.30
Government consumption 17.00 Trade Balance 1.64
Primary Balance -0.30 Foreign net asset position (stock) 16.17
Government deficit -2.10 Government Debt 60.00
3 Numerical procedure
The program is basically divided into two main blocks. One that computes the maximization
problem of the consumers and another that computes the solution for each production sector,
the government, and the remaining aggregate variables. We set the initial time in the year
2020 and run the model until 2070 with a grid of 2 years. This is the same grid for the age
structure of the population. The population lives from age 0 to a maximum of 110 years. For
this lifespan, they face a mortality function that they take into consideration when maximizing
(Guerra et al. (2018b)). This means that, for each scenario we ran, we computed the lifetime
optimization of 55 cohorts per year, for 25 times, representing 1375 consumer maximization
problems per scenario. More details regarding the demography can be found in Appendix A.
Although we run the model with a grid of 2 years, the Runge-Kutta algorithm performs
evaluations of the function at the midpoint of the step. In the case of the consumer block, we
are also interested in the solution of the system of differential equations for this midpoint. In
the Appendix of Guerra et al. (2018a) we show the adaptation made in the algorithm in order
for it to compute the solution for the midpoint. This means that although we are running
the model for 2-year intervals, we obtain the consumer plans with 1-year intervals. When we
solve the consumer problem, we store the values of the variables for the present node (actual
decisions) and for the next 2 nodes (planned decisions). Our main data file from the consumer
block is comprised of data containing 9 columns (v, t, h, π, a, c, sl, sh, sw) for these 3 periods.
For every year, we start by computing the population’s maximization problem, given the
wage rate and the human capital externality. The human capital externality depends on the
average human capital of the previous period so we needed to set up an initial distribution
of human capital per age at the start of the model. What we did was to run the full plan
for a person at age 0 until age 110 and decide to set the distribution of human capital of the
population similar to what that plan encompassed.11 After the population’s maximization
problem is solved we compute the program for the aggregate economy.
11We use the word similar instead of equal because we did some rounding on the human capital externality.
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On the aggregate economy, we have a system of 2 differential equations on A and D that we
solve using the same Runge-Kutta of fourth order. These functions depend on some variables
that are the generational integration of the consumer variables. Since this algorithm evaluates
the function at the initial node, at the end of the step but also performs mid step evaluations,
we use now the values stored from the consumer block, the planned variables for the next two
nodes. We do not integrate K̇ as K results from A.X.
Finally, due to the myopic expectations hypothesis, at the end of each iteration, we adjust
the assets of the population, transferring dividends, the excess return on capital and profit/loss
from the secondary market on patents to their balance sheets.
4 Results
4.1 Quantifying the problem
Table 3 presents information on the demographic transition that the economy will go through.
This transition is characterized not only by aging but also by a decrease in population (21.7%
in 50 years). By inspection of this table, it is easily understood why this will be a problem
for a PAYG pension system. The number of workers per retiree decrease from 3.45 to 1.72, a
cut in half. The total dependency ratio increases considerably from 57.6% to 87.3%. In terms
of the dynamics of the model, we can guess the impact will have the fact that labor force is
decreasing at an average rate of -0.83% per year, much higher than the average annual decrease
of the population (-0.49%). The relative size of the labor force decreases 10 percentage points
in the period.
Table 3: Demography
Young Workers Retired Young+Retired Population Workers/Retired
2020 106 1.84 6.43 1.86 3.71 10.14
3.452020 as % Pop. 18.2 63.4 18.4 36.6 –
2020 as % Workers 28.7 – 29.0 57.6 158
2070 106 1.24 4.24 2.47 3.70 7.94
1.722070 as % Pop. 15.6 53.4 31.0 46.6
2070 as % Workers 29.2 – 58.1 87.3 322.2
An. growth (%) -0.79 -0.83 0.57 0.57 -0.49
Source: Eurostat’s Population Projections Eurostat (2017). Data refers to the baseline scenario for
Portugal.
In Figure 1 we get to see that the movement of reduction of the relative size of labor force
happens during the first 30 years until near the year 2050. After this period, the relative size
of the population stabilizes at a new (lower) level. This seems to indicate that the biggest
effect of the demographic transition will be felt in the first half of our simulation.
We ran an invariant scenario with these demographic changes, which illustrates what would
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Figure 1: Labor force size relative to population









happen if no policy would be taken. Then we compute several scenarios with different policies.
We also ran a scenario without any demographic changes to use as a benchmark and few other
artificial scenarios that are useful to illustrate some particular issues of the problem we are
tackling.
Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics of the impact on the economy for the case of the
invariant scenario. We started with a public debt position of 60% of GDP and it explodes to
375.4%. Similarly, we started with a fairly balanced foreign position, but foreign debt explodes
too. This is a result of the increase in public debt as foreign trade is balanced on average.
The human capital that appears in the table is the average individual human capital in phase
2 of the life-cycle, so it represents human capital supplied to the labor market. This measure
is more relevant than the average human capital of the population. We see that it decreases
annually and we see also that individual labor supply decreases.
Table 4: Impact on the economy
% GDP An. growth %
Average Deficit -8.55 GDP 0.75
Average NX -0.41 Pensions 0.62
D2070 375.4 human cap. -0.12
F2070 300.2 s
w -0.29
GDP growth decreases, but what we are interested is in GDP per capita which, with a
shrinking population is higher. GDP per capita growths at an average of 1.25%, which is still
lower than the historical average since the 1960’s for Portugal, but this comparison may be
displaced as the Portuguese economy had a strong convergence in the 1960’s. This growth is
in line with the average since the 1990’s and even higher than in more recent years.
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As a complement to Table 4, Figure 2 provides information about the evolution in time of
some variables for the invariant scenario. We can notice that the big decrease in GDP happens
in the period where occurs the big decrease in the relative size of the labor force (See figure
1). This happens because it is the period where gH is affected negatively the most. Once the
labor force stabilizes at a new proportion relative to the population, GDP growth recovers.
We can also note the similarity of the trajectory (and of the concavity) of the growth rate of w
(labor productivity) with the evolution of human capital allocated to research. Trade Balance
deteriorates but recovers a bit towards the end. Its evolution is no cause of concern. Regarding
public finances, the economy starts with a primary balance of almost zero, but it deteriorates
continuously reaching levels of 5% to 6% more or less at half of the period simulated and never
recovering from that. As a consequence, the deficit continuously deteriorates, reaching a value
of -17.52% at the end of the simulation. The deterioration of the deficit causes public debt to
explode and this leads to an explosion of foreign debt.
Figure 2: Invariant scenario with demographic transition
gGDP
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The invariant scenario reveals the full extent of the problems arising from the demographic
transition for our small open economy. It is, clearly, a scenario that is not feasible as in the
real world international capital markets would demand higher interest rates as soon as signs of
loss of control of public finances appeared. This would exacerbate the problem and, at some
point, the international capital market will completely dry up, with everybody refusing to lend
to this government. A rescue plan would need to be put in place, which would require the
government to implement harsh policies to control the deficit. The scenario shows, then, the
inevitability of action by the government, either voluntarily or imposed.
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We also computed a scenario without demographic transition, in which the total popula-
tion, the age structure, and the mortality rate remained constant throughout the simulated
period. In this scenario, public debt increases from 60% to 69.5% by 2070 and foreign debt
increases from 16.2% to 53.6%. It is a very small increase in public debt for a 50 year period.
It means that, without demographic transition, the economy is basically balanced in what
regards public finances and that the debt explosion can be attributed to the demographic
transition.
We use this constant demography scenario as a benchmark. In the several policy experi-
ments we make, we try to get public debt by the year 2070 at a similar level to the one obtained
with constant demography. As we have to run the entire population’s consumer problem every
two years, we will be satisfied with final debt levels in some reasonable neighborhood of this
benchmark. Beyond some point, the time spent running the simulations is not worth it, as a
finer tuning of the final debt ratio does not bring extra insights.
4.2 Policy experiments
We test four ways in which the government can act to control the deficit. An increase in labor
income tax, a decrease in the replacement rate, a decrease in the educational subsidy and an
increase of the retirement age. For the remaining of this article, it will be useful to name all
scenarios with numbers. Naming the scenarios is useful because it eases the exposition and
brings clarity. Later, when we mention, for example, scenario 12, it will be easily understood
as a combination of scenario 1 and 2, or 234 as a combination of 2, 3 and 4:
0. Invariant with demographic changes.
0a. Invariant without demographic changes.
1. Labor income taxes increase linearly 0.26 percentage points per year.
2. Replacement rate decreases linearly until it reaches zero in 2054. It represents a decrease
of approximately 1.66 percentage points per year.
3. Educational subsidy decreases linearly approximately 0.37 percentage points per year.
4. Retirement age increases six years: to 67 in 2022, 68 in 2026, 69 in 2030, 70 in 2034, 71
in 2040, and 72 in 2046.
The level of the changes in policy in each scenario was obtained through experimentation as we
cannot determine a priori the required changes in policy. All of them manage to keep public
debt under control. The next table summarizes the results.
Scenario 3 and 4 deserve an introduction. Scenario 3 is a scenario that makes sense in our
model because educational expenses are an important public expense but are not comparable
to a real economy because educational expenses are linked to the wage rate and time dedicated
to studying. In this expense, the wage rate is multiplied by the educational subsidy rate and
by the time dedicated to studying. Since the wage rate increases every year and it increases at
a higher rate than GDP, if there is not a sufficient decrease in the time allocated to schooling,
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Table 5: Debt results by type of policy instrument
% of GDP
0a 0 1 2 3 4
D2070 69.51 375.38 66.96 67.92 66.31 66.64
F2070 53.55 300.23 52.89 -289.96 248.73 82.01
the weight of educational expenses on GDP will grow. What this scenario does is to reduce
γe at a rate not very different of the increase in w. It acts as a brake on the increase of
educational expenses.
In the case of scenario 4 we realized, not surprisingly, that increasing the retirement very
early in the simulation is more effective in reducing the debt. Basically, the increase in the
retirement age has to be preemptive as it needs to occur before the increase in the life expect-
ancy. The demographic data from Eurostat project an increase in life expectancy at birth of
6.16 years during this period and an increase of 4.56 years in life expectancy at age 65. This
scenario increases the same number of years as the increase of life expectancy at birth. This
is not the only configuration possible for the years where we chose to increase the retirement
age. The important thing to happen is that it really needs to have a strong emphasis at the
start of the simulation although some variation on the years can reach a similar result.
Portugal reformed its pension system to include a sustainable factor that links the evolu-
tion of the retirement age to changes in life expectancy at age 65. In our model, this would
not be enough, because we needed to increase the retirement age by 6 years.
Scenario 2 represents not only a cut in pensions, but pensions also have to be reduced to
zero by 2054. Relying only upon this instrument means that the PAYG pension system has
to be terminated.
Although all policies tested are successful in controlling public debt, scenario 3 fails to
control foreign debt. This happens because the educational subsidy also represents the source
of income in the first phase of the life-cycle. When it is reduced it will affect the differential
equation of assets right at the start, interfering with its accumulation, leading to a much lower
level of individual assets throughout the life-cycle. At the aggregate level, the private savings
of the population will be much lower and capital stock needs to be financed with international
funds.
In Figure 3 we show how the scenarios compare in terms of GDP growth rate and we
include the scenario without demographic changes that serves as the benchmark. All of them
display a decrease in the growth rate until 2046. It is interesting to compare this result with
figure 1 as it shows that the biggest impact in growth happens while the transition of the
relative size of labor force unfolds.
Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 display very similar growth rate trajectories as scenario 0 although
with different levels. Scenario 4 displays discrete jumps because of the discrete increases in
16














the retirement age. But it is clear that the growth rate of scenario 4 is, on average, the highest
from all policy scenarios considered.
We could take GDP per capita growth as a criterion to rank these alternatives, which boils
down to compare GDP growth as population growth is the same. GDP per capita is good as
an indication of standards of living. However, there is a better criterion. In the end, what
everyone wants is to be happy and it is the government’s duty (or should be) to ensure it can
be achieved as much as possible in a sustainable way. Therefore, we measured the impact of
each scenario on the population’s utility.
We computed the instantaneous utility for each cohort of the population and computed
a weighted average for each year. In all scenarios utility growths in time with not relevant
crossing points (See Appendix E.1), which allows us to compare the relative merit of each
policy by comparing the average population’s utility during the period.
We now introduce policy mix by combining several instruments. We had four instruments
and we conjugate them 2 by 2, 3 by 3 and one scenario with all instruments. There is an
infinite range of possibilities to combine them but we just explored one linear combination.
The additional scenarios computed are:
12. Half of the adjustment in 1 and half of the adjustment in 2. Labor income taxes increase
0.13 percentage points per year and the replacement rate decreases approximately 0.83
percentage points per year.
13. Adjustment in 1 like in 12 and half of the adjustment in 3. The educational subsidy
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decreases approximately 0.19 percentage points per year.
14. Adjustment in 1 like in 12 and retirement age increases three years: to 67 in 2022, 68 in
2030 and 69 in 2034
23. Adjustment in 2 like in 12 and adjustment in 3 like in 13.
24. Adjustment in 2 like in 12 and adjustment in 4 like in 14.
34. Adjustment in 3 like in 13 and adjustment in 4 like in 14.
123. One-third of the adjustment in 1, one-third of the adjustment in 2 and one-third of the
adjustment in 3. Labor income taxes increase approximately 0.09 percentage points per
year, the replacement rate decreases approximately 0.55 percentage points per year and
the educational subsidy decreases approximately 0.12 percentage points per year.
124. Adjustment in 1 and 2 like in 123 and retirement age is increased two years: to 67 in
2022 and to 68 in 2040
134. Adjustment in 1 and 3 like in 123 and in 4 like in 124.
234. Adjustment in 2 and 3 like in 123 and in 4 like in 124.
1234. One-fourth of the adjustment in 1, 2 and 3 and retirement age is postponed only one
time, to 67 in the year 2022. Labor income taxes increase approximately 0.07 percentage
points per year, the replacement rate decreases approximately 0.41 percentage points
per year and the educational subsidy decreases approximately 0.09 percentage points
per year.
The results of these policies are presented in Table 6.12 The scenario 0a, which is the
scenario with a constant demography is useful to study some properties of the model. For
example, all scenarios show negative average growth rates in human capital and labor supply
and part of this could be attributed to changes in the age structure of the population, but even
in scenario 0a this happens. A reduction on human capital and labor supply is also a response
of consumer’s to a higher wage rate, an effect we observed in the partial equilibrium analysis
of Guerra et al. (2018b) and which is now confirmed in general equilibrium. Regarding labor
supply, our results are not far from the historical trend. Data from the OECD (2018a) show
an annual growth of hours worked for Portugal of (−0.256%).
As equation (9) shows, GDP growth is the sum of the growth in the wage rate (productiv-
ity) plus a term that is a function of the difference between the growth of total human capital
and the growth of human capital applied to research and the size of the allocation of human
capital to the research sector. In all scenarios GDP growth is lower than the growth in w
because that second term in our simulations has always a negative contribution. Total human
capital grows at a negative rate because individual human capital and labor supply grow at a
negative rate. This is compounded on the scenarios with demographic changes as labor force
grows also at a negative rate. Human capital applied to research, however, can grow at a
positive or negative rate but this rate is always higher than the growth rate of total human
12In Table 6, averages are computed for the period 2020-2070 and h2 refers to individual human capital in
the second phase of the life-cycle.
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capital because we observe in all scenarios an increase in the allocation of human capital to
research.
In the theoretical case of a BGP, which requires no changes in the age structure of the
population, but in which population can grow, there would be a constant allocation of human
capital to research. In this case GDP growth (equation (10)) would still be lower than the
growth of w, due to the substitution of study and labor for leisure by consumers, unless the
growth rate of the population was sufficiently strong.
In the scenario without demographic changes, labor productivity which is determined by
the productivity in research, grows at a rate of 2.28% per year. If we subtract -0.44%, which
is the growth in total human capital (-0.13% from the individual human capital and -0.31%
from labor supply) we obtain 1.84%. The growth of potential output is slightly lower (1.76%)
due to the effected of the increase in the proportion of human capital allocated to research.
In the invariant scenario (0), productivity grows at 2.09% and GDP at 0.75%, meaning
that this adverse demography costs the economy 21 and 101 percentage points per year in
productivity and GDP growth, respectively. In scenarios in which we test policies to keep the
debt under control, GDP tends to grow at a higher rate because consumers react to these
measures, that impact negatively consumption, by working more hours. In some scenarios
there is also an increase in the time allocated to learning, resulting in increases in human
capital when comparing with the invariant scenario.
Although our model presents a very stylized version of a small open economy calibrated
with data from Portugal, it is somewhat reassuring that the 2018 Ageing Report from the
European Commission (DG-ECFIN (2018)) estimates an annual GDP growth rate of 0.9%
for an invariant scenario that includes only the automatic update of the sustainability factor,
which sits between our growth rate for the invariant scenario of 0.75% and the growth rate of
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We can observe that, with some varying degree of success, all tested policy mixes manage
to control public debt. There is a slight loss of traction in scenarios 24, 34 and 1234. Regarding
the policy mixes we tested, their results, presented in Table 6, are also combinations of the
base scenarios. That is why, from the perspective of controlling the public debt, there are no
reinforcing effects from combining different instruments. There are, however, complementarity
effects in what regards foreign debt. Scenario 2 produced a strong positive foreign position
while scenario 3 failed to control foreign debt. By combining them, scenario 23 produces a
satisfactory result both on public debt and on the foreign position. When scenario 3 is com-
bined with other scenarios that do not involve scenario 2, foreign debt is not controlled in a
satisfactory way.
The worst policy for the consumers is a cut in pensions (scenario 2), as this is the case
where the average utility of the population is lower. Cutting pensions is also the scenario
where productivity and GDP grow at a lower rate even taking into consideration that it is the
scenario with the higher average labor supply.
The best policy for the population is an increase in the retirement age (scenario 4). Al-
though this scenario does not perform so well in terms of foreign debt it performs better in
many other domains. Besides being the scenario where average utility is higher, it is also the
scenario where average utility grows at a faster rate. It is the policy that results in a higher
growth rate of productivity and GDP because it is the one with the strongest effect on human
capital accumulation.13
From the analysis we performed, just increasing the retirement age is the best policy, unless
there are no extra concerns regarding foreign debt. If we would like to see a lower level of
foreign debt in 2070, we have to consider one of the scenarios that end with a level of foreign
debt not much higher than the benchmark scenario (23, 24, 123, 124, 234, 1234). Using the
criteria of average utility, the best is 24, which is a combination of a cut in pensions and an
increase in the retirement age.
4.3 Population decrease versus change in the age structure
In this section, we try an exercise that can help to shed some light on the relative magnitude
of the difficulties posed by the decrease of the total population and by the change in the age
structure. We compute a scenario in which aging occurs (the age structure changes) but we
keep total population constant. We take the population dataset and compute the weights of
the cohorts in total population from 2020 to 2070. After we assume that total population
stays constant at the 2020 level and compute the new population per age with those weights.
14 This scenario is the one labeled (0c - Change) presented in Table 7 in the next subsection.
13Average h2 may be influenced by the way average is calculated, as the active life period keeps expanding, but
we can also see that it is the scenario with the highest average human capital regarding the entire population.
14There is a technical issue here as the exercise was done in order for the sum of all age population, obtained
from the data, to be the same every year, but since these are densities that we integrate, there are slight
variations in the total population. However, this should have a very little impact on results and for the type of
analysis we perform here, are irrelevant.
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In the invariant scenario, the government debt deteriorates from 60% in 2020 to 375.38%
in 2070, an increase of 315.38 percentage points. With the current scenario, government debt
rises to 278.03% in 2070, a 218.03 percentage points increase. Hence, the change in age struc-
ture has more impact on government debt than the decrease in the size of the population.
Once we control for the population size, 69% of the initial deterioration still unfolds. The
decrease in the size of the population has a slightly bigger impact on foreign debt but similar
conclusions can be drawn regarding the relative importance of changes in the age structure.
Foreign debt now rises 173.78 percentage points, approximately 61% of the initial deterioration.
This analysis shows also that relying only on replacement migration to solve the demo-
graphic problem has a limited effect. Nevertheless, if the median age of migrants is younger
than the age of the resident population, migration will also cause some impact on the age struc-
ture. This is usually what happens as migration is frequently motivated by families searching
for a better country to live and work.15 Summing up, the contribution of migration will be
higher, the younger migrants are.
4.4 The behavioral effect
An increase in the life expectancy will increase the dependency ratios, putting pressure on
the pension system. There will be a lower proportion of the population producing goods and
services supplied to the market. This is the accounting effect of aging. Nevertheless, economic
literature suggests that there should be a positive behavioral effect in the sense that people
should react to a higher life expectancy by working more and investing more in human cap-
ital, becoming in this way, more productive. This positive effect can mitigate the negative
accounting effect. In Guerra et al. (2018b), in a partial equilibrium analysis, we showed the
existence of this positive effect. However, we need to study what happens in a general equi-
librium analysis, as consumer decisions impact the firm’s decisions, not only in what regards
the production of goods but also on research. We also need to quantify it, because we would
like to have a reasonable estimate of its magnitude.
The scenarios we computed already have an eventual behavioral effect accounted for be-
cause we let the mortality rate change. In this way, the invariant scenario (0) in which public
debt explodes, already demonstrates that if this effect exists, it is not enough to counteract
the negative effects of aging.
The exercise we performed was to recompute some scenarios but now using the same sur-
vival function for the whole period.16 By comparing the scenario in which the survival function
changes with the scenario in which it doesn’t, we can attribute the differences to the reaction
of the consumer’s to a higher life expectancy. In Table 7 we present the cases for the scenario
15The scenario tested in this section could be considered a case in which there was a sufficient extra influx of
migration to avoid a decrease in population with the implicit assumption that the age distribution of migrants
is the same as the resident population. However, the comparison is not straightforward as migrants with age
over 66 would not be a burden for the pension system as they would be receiving a pension from their home
country.
16We do not recompute all scenarios as it seemed not necessary. These three case point to similar conclusions.
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without demographic transition (0a), the scenario that allows changes in the age structure but
without a decrease in the population size that was analyzed in the previous subsection (0c)
and the policy invariant scenario (0).
Table 7: Comparing scenarios with and without changes in the mortality law
0a 0c 0
No change Change No change Change No change Change
As percentage of GDP
D2070 69.51 67.22 281.99 278.03 380.44 375.38
F2070 53.55 44.26 205.35 189.94 316.65 300.23
Av. B -0.35 -0.32 -3.23 -3.18 -3.71 -3.66
Av. Def -2.39 -2.33 -7.33 -7.25 -8.64 -8.55
Av. P 7.64 7.62 12.29 12.24 12.45 12.41
Av. E 13.98 13.93 13.35 13.30 13.30 13.25
Av. C 55.19 54.88 61.68 61.29 62.09 61.71
Av. Inv. 24.93 25.02 23.90 23.99 21.61 21.71
Av. NX 2.88 3.10 -2.58 -2.28 -0.70 -0.41
Av. Ā 299.52 302.25 328.86 333.40 324.48 329.01
Annual growth rates (%)
GDP 1.76 1.78 1.31 1.33 0.73 0.75
w 2.28 2.28 2.19 2.19 2.08 2.09
P/GDP -0.81 -0.81 0.57 0.56 0.63 0.62
E/GDP 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.19
C 1.39 1.39 1.31 1.31 0.76 0.76
Consumer variables
Av. h 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458 0.458
gh (%) -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13
Av. h2 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.518 0.518
gh2 (%) -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12
Av. sw 0.337 0.338 0.338 0.340 0.339 0.340
gsw (%) -0.312 -0.302 -0.312 -0.301 -0.304 -0.294
Av. util. -2.5322 -2.5322 -2.4768 -2.4826 -2.4899 -2.4957
gutility (%) 1.07 1.07 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.07
We may observe that this positive effect exists and operates mainly via an increase in labor
supply. There is also a very slight increase in the average human capital but is not visible
at 3 decimal points. Labor supply still decreases as a result of the increase in the wage rate
but decreases at a slower pace. As a result, the growth rate of the stock of ideas (not shown)
is 2 basis points higher, the investment rate is 9 basis points higher (10 basis points in the
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invariant scenario) and GDP grows 2 basis points higher.
At the end of the 50 year period that we ran the model, the government’s debt and foreign
debt are lower, but not by much, with the impact being even more modest in the government’s
debt than in the foreign debt. For the invariant scenario (0), the behavioral effect has a pos-
itive impact of public debt in 2070 of approximately 5 percentage points. We conclude that
this positive effect exists but is quantitatively small.
4.5 The model and the real world
In this section, we discuss how the results of this article could compare with a real economy.
Some of the hypothesis used for simplification may cause an overestimation of the problems
arising from an adverse demographic transition, while others may cause an underestimation.
This is a highly simplified version of an economy so we will just focus on a few aspects of the
model.
Our output is potential output obtained with zero unemployment. In the real world, even
if the economy is at full employment, there will always be unemployment. The way potential
output is estimated by economists includes some percentage of the unemployed population.
In the real world, the economy is subject to business cycles and crisis. The deeper the crisis,
the heavier the extra weight put on public finances. For example, in the recent great recession
originated by the US subprime mortgage crisis, Portugal needed an international bailout and
the unemployment rate rose from 9.1% in 2007 to a peak of 16.4% in 2013. These high levels
of unemployment are not accounted for in our model, causing the model to underestimate
problems of debt financing.
Another source of underestimation is that we rely on a demographic scenario that includes
an estimate of migration. If migration is lower than projected, the public debt problem will
be more acute. Also, we consider no heterogeneity in human capital but is reasonable to
assume that a relevant proportion of immigrants have lower human capital than the resident
population, as many come from less developed countries in search for higher salaries. On the
other hand, higher migration rates than projected, improve the demographic scenario. We
saw above the if population decline was prevented, the debt explosion would reduce in nearly
one third. Furthermore, migrants tend to be younger, on average, than the resident population.
An important assumption is the initial level of the government debt to GDP ratio. We
started with 60%. If we started with double this value, which is, for example, the case in
Portugal, debt dynamics would make the goal of keeping debt sustainable harder to achieve.
On the positive side, a feature of the model that may be overestimating the problem, is
the fact that not everybody can adjust labor supply downwards because most workers have
labor contracts stipulating some minimum amount of hours of work. Our hypothesis of free
allocation of time was made to enhance the behavioral effect, but it applies more realistically
to the self-employed population. This means that, as a reaction to an increase in the wage
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rate, we should expect labor supply at the intensive margin to decrease at a slower rate.17
GDP should grow at a faster rate.
Also, the behavioral effect is probably stronger than computed, because the survival laws
we used, result in a smaller increase in life expectancy than the one implicit in the age struc-
ture of the data. Plus, we only changed the survival law every 10 years, with the first change
occurring only in 2030.
More important, are the simplifications we took with the government sector. We assumed
in the model that the entire population has the same rule for determining the pension benefit.
In reality, there are subsets of the population with different rules, many of them more favorable
than the general rule. If these subsets are big, they will cause additional problems in financing
social security.18 We did not include several taxes, like the VAT or excise duties in mineral oils,
tobacco and alcohol. With fixed tax rates, the revenues from the VAT, and in some degree,
excise duties, should grow at a similar rate as consumption. We implemented a rule that
makes the lump sum tax rate to grow at the same rate as private consumption, but lump sum
revenues are still affected by the growth rate of the population, which is negative. Therefore,
our lump sum revenues are growing at an annual rate of that is the growth rate of consumption
(the growth rate of VAT) minus 0.49%, which is underestimating annual government revenues.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we ran numerically a general equilibrium model developed in Guerra et al.
(2018a,b). We tested the impact over a period of 50 years of a demographic transition. Over
this period, total population decreases 21.7% and the proportion of the labor force decreases
10 percentage points.
With constant demography, the economy would have sustainable debt as both public and
foreign debt increase moderately. However, with demographic changes and in case the gov-
ernment does nothing, both public and foreign debt would explode. GDP growth is hit the
hardest during the relative decrease in the proportion of the labor force. Once this proportion
stabilizes in a new lower level, GDP growth recovers somewhat.
The government’s policies that we test are an increase in social security contributions, a
cut in pensions, an increase in the retirement age and a cut in educational expenses. All these
alternatives manage to keep government debt sustainable and with the exception of the cut
in educational expenses. They also keep foreign debt sustainable. We also test some linear
combinations of these policies and they also manage to control the government’s debt. There is
some complementarity in cutting pensions and cutting educational expenses in what regards
foreign debt, as cutting pensions has a strong effect in moving the economy towards a net
creditor position, and in this way compensates for the poor result that cutting educational
17In the invariant scenario, it decreased an average of -0.31% per year.
18Rodrigues and Pereira (2007) make this point for Portugal.
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expenses has in this variable.
We use the population’s average utility as a ranking criterion among these options. The
most penalizing policy for the consumer is the cut in pensions and the least penalizing is
the increase in the retirement age. Relying solely upon the increase in the retirement age is
also better in several other dimensions. It is the policy in which consumers decide to accu-
mulate more human capital, delivering the highest productivity and GDP growth amongst
the alternatives we tested. Nevertheless, it was necessary to increase the retirement age 6
years, during the first half of the 50 year period of the simulation. The data we use has an
implicit increase in life expectancy at birth of 6 years during that period. To be effective, the
increase in the retirement age can be of a similar magnitude as the increase in life expectancy
at birth but has to be implemented preemptively. If we didn’t concentrate the increase in the
first half of the simulated period we would not have been able to control the government’s debt.
We also analyze the relative impact of the decrease in the population size and the change
in the age structure on debt explosion and conclude that roughly 2/3 can be attributed to the
change in the age structure and 1/3 to a decline in the population.
Finally, we assess the quantitative importance of the behavioral effect, the consumer reac-
tion to a higher life expectancy. We observe that this effect exists at the general equilibrium
level and operates mainly through an increase in labor supply with negligible effects in hu-
man capital accumulation. It is, however, quantitatively small. In the scenarios we tested,
it increased the investment rate by 9-10 basis points, GDP growth by 2 basis points and in
the invariant scenario, its impact on the government debt at the end of the simulation was
only of 5 percentage points. The behavioral effect may be biased downwards because of some
decisions made regarding the numerical program, but it should sit still too far to significantly
counteract the deterioration of the dependency ratios.
Appendix
A Demography
The population age distribution we use is taken from Eurostat’s baseline population projec-
tions for Portugal by (Eurostat (2017)). We run the full model of the economy for the years
2020-2070 based on them. The projections include population by age composition till age 99
and a class defined 100+. We interpolated the values till age 110. Population by age was
divided by 2 years intervals. Regarding the mortality function we computed initially two mor-
tality functions. One for the year 2015 based on data from the Human Mortality Database
(2017) and another for the year 2080 based in Eurostat’s projections.19 Then we linearly inter-
polated between these two to obtain mortality functions for 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050 and 2060.
To simplify the computation process, we decided to not change the mortality function every
year. Instead, we used the one from 2020 to compute the consumer maximization programs for
the years 2020 to 2028, the one from 2030 was applied from 2030 to 2038, the mortality rate
19We used the Human Mortality Database data for 2015 as this data was more detailed.
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for 2040 was applied from 2040 to 2048, the one for 2050 was applied from 2050 to 2058 and
the mortality computed for 2060 was applied from 2060 to 2070. For the partial equilibrium
analysis in Guerra et al. (2018b) we used the mortality functions estimated for 2020 and, for
the examples with a higher life expectancy, the one estimated for 2080.
When we computed the mortality function with the data for 2080, we realized that the
probability of surviving age 110 was close to zero but not so close as we would like it to be.
Since the mortality function enters as integrand in several integrals and since we use a cutoff
at age 110 on integrals that are analytically defined to infinity, we need this probability to
survive age 110 as close to zero as possible in order to avoid significant numerical errors. So
we changed slightly the function we computed in Mathematica in order to achieve this. This
change has the side effect that the aging those mortality functions display is milder than the
aging that Eurostat has implied and, therefore, there is a mismatch between the aging the
structure of the population reveals and the aging that consumers take into consideration when
optimizing.20 Nevertheless, everything considered, we decided to proceed with the change
as we preferred to minimize numerical errors on the computing of the integrals. Whenever
discussing the results we will refer to the aging Eurostat predicts as the aging implicit in the
change of age structure of the population, as it should be more relevant for results than the
aging displayed in the mortality function that acts as a discount factor for lifetime utility and
a mortality premium on the return of the consumer’s net assets.
We chose to use a Gompertz-Makeham mortality function in our work and followed a
procedure described in Mathemathica’s help files to generate a probability density function
table to which we fitted a Gompertz-Makeham function distribution. 21 It’s hazard function
is given by
mv(t) = a+ b.e
c.(t−v), with a > 0, b > 0, c > 0.
Where v is date of birth and t date to where the mortality rate is being computed.
We provide some relevant definitions of demographic variables,
Lv(t) count of people born at v and alive at t;
L(t) =
∫ t
−∞ Lv(, t)dv population at date t;
n(t) = L̇(t)/L(t) growth rate of population at date t;












mv(θ)dθ = −mv(t)Lv(t) (2)
20These mortality functions have an implicit increase of life expectancy at birth, from 2020 to 2060, of 2.3
years. Eurostat predicts it to be around 5.1 years.
21This function on Mathematica is built with four parameters. We require only three, so we imposed a value
of zero to remaining parameter
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As the theoretical model was developed in other papers we present here the relevant functional
forms to allow a better understanding of the parameters that were calibrated.
B.1 Consumer Problem












































The state variables (h, π, a, b) represent, respectively, human capital, accumulated gross labor
income, assets and a solvency condition. The control variables (c, sl, sh, sw) represent, respect-
ively, consumption and time allocated to leisure, study and work. S and R are, respectively,
the age of end of the mandatory schooling and the age of retirement. The model has two
interest rates and r represents the lower interest rate. w is the wage rate, d represents flows
related with the aggregate capital market and η is a human capital externality defined as




Regarding the parameters related with the government, γe represents an educational subsidy,
z0 is a lump sum tax, zl is a combination of labor income tax and social security contributions,
zp is a tax on pension income and θ is the replacement rate.
22A subscript ∗t indicates a quantity being forecast or planned at time t for some time into the future. E.g.,




The production block of the economy has three sectors. The production of the final goods







, µ, γ > 0, 0 < α < 1 (4)
Where X represents the quantity of a specific variable of durable good and HY is the aggregate
effective human capital used in this sector. Note that the definition of effective human capital
includes time allocated to work:
H(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞ Lv(t)hv(t)swv (t)dv (5)
With the symmetry property of the durable goods, X(i, t) = X(t), expression (4) simplifies to:
Y(t) = µHY(t)
1−αA(t)1/γX(t)α (6)
The expected instantaneous pre-tax cash-flow function for each firm in the durable goods
sector is:
πi(t) = (1− tp(t)) (p(i, t) − (rk + δx))X(i, t) (7)
Where p represents the price of a specific variety of durable good, tp is the corporate tax, rk
is the high interest rate and δx the depreciation rate of capital.








Where HA is the aggregate effective human capital used in research and A
∗ is the stock of
ideas at the world technological frontier.
The GDP growth rate for the general case is given by:














gA + gH (10)
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C Numerical aspects
Our decision of working with a fixed mesh of nodes conditioned the algorithms we used. The
two dimensions that needed discretization were time and age. For simplicity, we decided to
use the same grid size in both dimensions.
Working with a fixed grid precluded us from using integration rules, like the Gaussian
quadrature, in which nodes are chosen optimally. Our integrations are made either using the
Simpson rule or using the Trapezoidal rule.
Regarding the algorithms, we use a root finding algorithm R, another in Rn and a Runge-
Kutta of order 4.23
D Computing T = A∗/A
To obtain our measure of the distance to frontier we use the final goods sector production
function.24
Y = µH1−αY A
1/γ−αKα

































The bar on time dedicated to work and human capital represent an average and Lf stands














































23The code and the data used can be made available on request.
24We skip indexation by time as it makes notation easier to follow and should be clear which are the variables.
25Regarding the parameters, we assume that both economies are distinguishable only by the catching-up term
in the production function of research.
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To compute this we use data of GDP per capita at current prices (purchasing power parity:
international dollars) from the International Monetary Fund (2017) for Portugal and the US.
We use the US as a proxy for the economy at the world technological frontier. We use data











For the ratio of the share of the labor force on the population we use data from the Ameco Database





















And for the ratio of average human capital, we used Barro and Lee (2013) estimateS of the
average years of total schooling (population aged 15-64). We preferred to use the last data










Since, in this exercise, we decided to align GDP with the production of the final goods sector
and since K/Y = α/p̄ depends only on parameters that we assume to be the same in both





With γ = 1.95, we obtain A∗/A ≈ 3.428. We used T = 3.43 in the numerical simulation.
E Parameters based in annual data
Our model has the particularity that time allocation is defined as a proportion of total available
time. This means that when we are calibrating the model based on data, we are obtaining para-
meters defined on a different scale. In this appendix, we show the reason that our parameter ζ
has such a low value. In the following, we shall name variables for an equivalent model based
on annual data with the superscript ˜. We call cs the constant that multiplied by s
h, sw, sl will
define those variables as annual variables. Then, with influence at the aggregate economy, we
have s̃w = css
w and we need to determine the impact of s̃h = css
h on individual human capital.
26Once we include the research sector in the GDP, the capital output ratio is no longer constant.
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Of which t is the time of planning and t − v the age of planning. We are going to make
an assumption in the following exercise. As consumers optimize taking the human capital
externality η as given and that they do not know how it will evolve in the future, they assume
the same value for the entire planning horizon. Nevertheless, η changes in time and is one of
the reasons consumers update their plans. However, we are going to assume throughout the
section, that η will not change. This will allow us to use the differential equation for planned
human capital as valid for effective human capital.






























































And we confirm that the scale factor is the same for all population, regardless of when the



































































This means also that H̃Y(t) = cHY(t) and H̃A(t) = cHA(t). HY is supplied to the final
goods sector, but the production function of this sector has the scale parameter µ that will
do the adjustment without needing to adjust other parameters. However, the situation is not
the same in the research sector as there is no scale factor in the production function of research.
To investigate the adjustment needed in the production function of research we start the




(1− tp)(1− αγ)α ˜RMP(t)









We start with the case of the economy at the frontier, because we are also using annual data





















We do a similar exercise, using (13), for the economy that is not at the frontier,[




ξA(t)ϕA−1 + ζ(T(t) − 1)
]
We can proceed by equalizing the domestic term and after the catching-up term. Taking in
consideration the above hypothesis, ϕ̃A = ϕA and ξ̃ = ξ, we get,
ξ̃Ã(t)ϕ̃A−1c = ξA(t)ϕA−1 ⇔ Ã(t) = A(t)c −1ϕA−1
But, together with (14), this implies
T̃(t) = T(t)
Then, when we compare the catching-up term, we get
ζ̃(T̃(t) − 1) = ζ(T(t) − 1) ⇔ ζ̃ = ζ
c
(15)
This shows that if we use annual data to calibrate our model, we can do it with ϕ̃A = ϕA,
ξ̃ = ξ, which will result in T̃(t) = T(t), but there is an adjustment we need to make in the
parameter ζ. The ζ̃ represents the value we will use to simulate the model, to be comparable
with all other parameters derived from annual data. That is why it is so low. In other words,
the fact that we use time allocation as not full time, but as a fraction, will be scaled by µ
in the production function of the final goods sector and by ζ in the production function of
research.
E.1 Utility
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